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Abstract. This paper examines the reliability of financial analysts’ con-
sensus earnings forecasts in the 1990s. Analysts are often accused of
having fuelled the stock market boom with exaggerated evaluations of
firms’ prospects. However, this criticism primarily refers to the analysts’
buy recommendations rather than earnings forecasts. Although biases in
earnings forecasts have been reported since the 1980s, a systematic study
capturing the period of ‘irrational exuberance’ until 2000 on the German
stock market has not yet been published. Our data set consists of DAX100
firms, leaving out the peculiarities of forecasting earnings (or rather
losses) of young technology firms. To evaluate the information content of
analysts’ forecasts, we confront them with five alternative forecasting
models. The empirical results reveal that analysts’ forecasts were too
optimistic throughout the entire sample period. However, contrary to the
increase in stock prices, the optimistic bias has declined over time. If the
bias is removed, the analysts’ consensus forecasts significantly outper-
form all other models considered. Thus, the forecasts seem to be
informative with respect to earnings differences, even if the market level
of earnings is optimistically overstated.
1. Introduction
The boom in the international stock markets during
the 1990s came along with a growing influence of
financial analysts. Especially some technology and
e-commerce analysts attracted great attention with
their supposition that the ‘‘internet age’’ was
calling for new, less conservative valuation stand-
ards. Referring to such a growth-oriented valuation,
many analysts maintained their buy recommenda-
tions even when stock prices reached extremely
high levels as measured by economic fundamentals.
Later it turned out that some analysts had even
deliberately deceived investors.[1]
This experience has turned the public’s and the
regulators’ attention to conflicts of interest that might
distort the analysts’ predictions.[2] Often, there is a
close relationship between the research group and
the investment division of a bank. In the past, the
bonuses of the analysts often depended on the profit
of the investment banking division. The ‘‘Chinese
Wall’’ that was meant to create a barrier between
investment banking and brokerage seemed to be as
permeable as the historical building in China.
Under these circumstances, analysts might be
under pressure to publish positive reports in order
to establish a favourable banking relationship with
the management of the respective firms. Besides,
analysts have an incentive to induce investors to
higher trading volumes in order to generate com-
mission fees. The commissions earned from clients
who are provided with research services constitute
an indirect form of remuneration. Since buy
recommendations are of interest to all investors,
whereas sell recommendations can only be fol-
lowed by those currently holding the stock,
analysts will tend to give positive evaluations.
There is convincing evidence of prevailing buy
rankings during the boom of the 1990s.[3] The
criticism focused on these recommendations. But
analysts also express their view about the pros-
pects of a firm by issuing earnings forecasts. On
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the one hand, these are closely related to the
investment recommendations since the present
value of future residual earnings plus the book
value of equity equals the intrinsic stock value.[4]
Thus, buy recommendations should be accompa-
nied by optimistic earnings forecasts compared to
market expectations. On the other hand, there are
several reasons why the conflicts of interest
might show up more distinctly in recommenda-
tions than in earnings forecasts. Firstly, reported
earnings can be expected to be more closely
linked to the firm’s profitability and less strongly
influenced by irrational exuberance. Thus, overly
optimistic earnings forecasts will be detected
with a high probability at the end of the pre-
diction period, which will supposedly discipline
analysts. In contrast, stock price forecasts are
more difficult to assess since the result largely
depends on the forecast horizon assumed. Sec-
ondly, in a stock market boom, it can be rational
to buy even at a very high price level. Analysts,
for instance, who issued sell recommendations in
the second half of the 1990s due to exaggerated
stock prices got into trouble when prices depart-
ed even further from fundamental values. Third-
ly, analysts’ earnings forecasts are often regarded
as a target for the company’s management.[5] To
ensure that it does not fall short of this target,
management is in general not interested in un-
realistically high target earnings. Analysts seeking
to improve management access will take this
aspect into consideration. Fourthly, internal ana-
lyst rankings applied by large investment institu-
tions seem to be primarily based on earnings
estimates rather than recommendations.[6] This
could create an incentive for analysts to provide
accurate forecasts.
For these reasons, the earnings forecasts for the
next few years might convey a more realistic
impression of the fair value of stocks than the buy-
or sell recommendations. This raises the question
whether earnings forecasts simply reflected the
same irrational exuberance as stock prices or
whether they were less strongly biased and could
have been used by investors as an indication of
unjustified price levels.
In this paper, we examine the accuracy of I/B/E/S
consensus forecasts for the time period from 1991
to 2000. We test whether analysts, on average,
displayed a particularly high degree of optimism
in the second half of the last decade. We also examine
firm-specific determinants of forecasting accuracy in
order to find out if corrections for the optimistic bias
are possible. The knowledge of the relevant determi-
nants is particularly important for investors who
restrict themselves to investments in firms with
particular characteristics (e.g., large stocks, value
stocks).[7] The average error in this subsample might
strongly differ from the overall mean.
The study excludes stocks listed on the former
Neuer Markt. The latter firms exhibited peculiar-
ities, such as huge losses combined with high
market values, which are not examined in this
study. It is important to point out that the study
does not primarily aim at analyzing the relevance
of analysts’ potential conflicts of interest. A de-
tailed analysis of this issue would require individ-
ual as opposed to consensus analyst forecasts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes
the data. In Section 4, we measure the forecasting
accuracy and analyze its determinants. Section 5
compares the analysts’ forecasts with alternative
forecasting models. The paper concludes with a
brief summary.
2. Related Literature
The most obvious and serious bias in analysts’
earnings forecasts that prior research in the U.S. as
well as Europe has uncovered is an exaggerated
optimism.[8] The mean surprise at the time of
earnings publication is typically negative and sig-
nificant. The contrary result of BROWN (1996)
can be attributed to the data set and the short time
period under study.[9] The degree of over-opti-
mism appears to be more pronounced for longer
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forecast horizons.[10] Typically, the initially very
optimistic forecasts are adjusted downward as time
passes.[11] In the U.S., the bias has diminished
over time.[12] The over-optimism of analysts may
be explained by their conflicts of interest men-
tioned earlier. Yet, the relative importance of these
conflicts is still open to debate, since internal
information on business relations of an analyst’s
employer is usually not available.
HONG/KUBIK (2003) argue that both higher ac-
curacy and more pronounced optimism are favour-
able for the career outcomes of analysts. The
authors find that the relative importance of an
optimistic attitude increased during the recent stock
market boom. In a study of German companies
over six years, LO¨FFLER (1998b) compares dif-
ferent explanations for the existence of biases in
earnings forecasts. The empirical data are com-
patible with the hypothesis that analysts are
overconfident and perceive the addressees of their
forecasts to underreact. In this environment,
analysts deliberately deviate from rational expect-
ations in order to better communicate their view of
the firms’ prospects. CHAN/KARECSKI/LAKO-
NISHOK (2003) find evidence in support of
strategic adjustments of analyst forecasts in recent
years. Forecasts are adjusted downwards in order
to enable management to exceed expectations.[13]
To reconcile this argument with the optimistic bias,
one might conjecture analysts to gradually lower
their initially exaggerated forecasts until they fall
below the rational expectations level shortly before
the earnings announcement. EASTERWOOD/
NUTT (1999) document that the reactions of
analysts are contingent on the type of information
they receive.[14] They underreact both to neg-
ative information and to abnormally negative
previous forecast errors and at the same time
overreact both to positive information and to
abnormally positive forecast errors.
Several studies investigate which firm-level factors
influence the degree of over-optimism. BROWN
(1997), HU¨FNER/MO¨LLER (1997) and HODG-
KINSON (2001) report a stronger bias for small
firms. DAS/LEVINE/SIVARAMAKRISHNAN
(1998) find more optimistic forecasts for firms
whose earnings are difficult to forecast on the basis
of past information, like time-series of earnings. The
mean error also seems to be large when analysts
disagree about the prospects of a firm so that the
dispersion of forecasts is large.[15] Another stream
of literature deals with the performance of analysts
relative to alternative forecasting models. At the U.S.
market and in different European countries, analysts’
forecasts of quarterly and annual earnings appear to
be more precise than time-series models.[16]
BOLLIGER (2004) and LIM (2001) summarize
studies on factors explaining differences in the
accuracy of individual analysts’ earnings fore-
casts.[17] CLEMENT (1999) finds that in the
U.S., forecasting accuracy is positively related with
analysts’ experience [18] and the size of their
employers and negatively related with the number
of firms and industries followed. In a sample of
European companies, BOLLIGER (2004) obtains
dramatically different results. Surprisingly, the ex-
perience of analysts in Europe seems to be nega-
tively correlated with the quality of their forecasts.
The study of MCEWEN/HUNTON (1999) high-
lights differences in the specific use of accounting
information. In general, analysts seem to have a
tendency to place too much weight on salient infor-
mation relative to long-term general conditions.
DE BONDT/THALER (1990) conclude: ‘‘The
same pattern of overreaction found in the predic-
tions of naive undergraduates is replicated in the
predictions of stock market professionals. Fore-
casted changes are simply too extreme to be con-
sidered rational.’’[19] COOPER/DAY/LEWIS
(2001) develop a framework to provide an objec-
tive assessment of analyst quality. They identify
lead analysts and measure the impact of their
forecasts on stock prices.
For the German stock market, there are only few
studies on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings fore-
casts. In the first comprehensive study, HU¨FNER/
MO¨LLER (1997) analyzed biases in earnings
forecasts and determinants of forecasting accuracy
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for 206 German stocks in the time period from
1980 to 1993. The forecasts were collected from five
major German banks. CAPSTAFF/PAUDYAL/
REES (1998) provide additional evidence based on
I/B/E/S individual analysts’ forecasts over the
period from 1987 to 1995. They compare the
forecasting accuracy of German firms with previous
results for the U.K.
Our paper contributes to the literature in the fol-
lowing ways. We extend the studies by HU¨FNER/
MO¨LLER (1997) and CAPSTAFF/PAUDYAL/
REES (1998) to a more recent time period in order
to gain insight into the forecasting accuracy in the
peculiar market conditions of the second half of the
last decade. We provide a more detailed analysis of
firm-level factors of forecasting accuracy and sys-
tematically compare the analysts’ forecasts with
alternative forecasting models. The overall objective
is to provide relevant information for evaluating the
usefulness and quality of analysts’ forecasts for
German firms.
3. Data and Definitions
Our data base consists of the I/B/E/S-Summary
History over the time period 1991–2000.E20^ I/B/
E/S gathers annual earnings forecasts from a large
number of banks and brokerage houses all over
the world. The Summary History file aggregates
all forecasts generated by analysts of the same
company at a given point in time. Each data set
consists of the company analyzed, the time of
prediction, the forecast period (fiscal year), the
number of available forecasts and the parameters
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum of the distribution of forecasts. As
usual, we refer to the median instead of the mean
as consensus forecast in order to minimize the
influence of extreme input data. The inputs are
updated every month. Individual analyst forecasts
are not available for this study.
We focus on German stocks that are part of the
DAX100 index. To avoid a look back or survivor-
ship bias, we keep track of the changing compo-
sition of the index. At each time of prediction, the
respective DAX100 companies are included in the
analysis. We exclude data sets with less than three
inputs underlying the consensus forecast. All
forecasted and reported earnings are calculated on
a continuing operations basis. Extra-ordinary
charges and other non-operating items are backed
out. To this end, most analysts in Germany apply
the DVFA/SG scheme.[21,22]
Earnings per share do not seem to be appropriate
for cross-sectional comparisons because they
depend on the partitioning of equity. With fewer
shares outstanding, ceteris paribus, share prices
and earnings will be higher and forecasts will thus
be subject to greater errors. This scale effect can
be neutralized by deflating earnings by the stock
price or the book value of equity. Market value
deflation renders the time series of forecast errors
difficult to interpret since it then depends on
general stock market moves.[23] Therefore, we
deflate earnings by book value of equity. These
deflated earnings form the basis of all further
analyses.[24,25] In three cases, negative book
values of equity occur (Babcock AG, Holzmann
AG, Metallgesellschaft AG) so that the data sets
concerned cannot be considered.
As a result of the deflation, forecast errors FE are
defined as the difference between forecasted and
actual book equity rates of return:
FEi;t;T ¼ CAFi;t;T  EPSi;T
EKi;T
; ð1Þ
where CAFi,t,T is the consensus forecast of
earnings of firm i issued by analysts at time t for
fiscal year T, EPSi,T is defined as actual earnings
per share of firm i in period T, and EKi,T is the per
share book value of equity of firm i at the
beginning of period T.
The cross-sectional mean of forecast errors MFE
at a given point in time t can be interpreted as a
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measure of over-optimism (MFE > 0) or over-
pessimism (MFE < 0) of analysts:
MFEt;T ¼ 1
Nt;T
XNt;T
i¼1
FEi;t;T ; ð2Þ
where Nt,T denotes the number of firms for which
consensus forecasts for period T are available at
time t.
As a measure of dispersion, we calculate the
cross-sectional standard deviation SFE of forecast
errors:
SFEt;T ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
Nt;T  1
XNt;T
i¼1
FEi;t;T  MFEt;T
 2
vuut :
ð3Þ
The measures MFE and SFE are only calculated if
the relevant input data are available for at least 50
out of 100 index firms.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the deflated
(actual) earnings of DAX100 firms in the 1990s.[26]
The mean rises substantially during the sample
period. It varies between a minimum of 6.8% and a
maximum of 15.2%. The earnings distribution is
negatively skewed in most years, which can be
partly attributed to earnings management.[27] The
kurtosis mostly exceeds 3. Thus, compared with a
normal distribution, a larger fraction of earnings is
at the extremes of the distribution.
4. Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts
4.1 Optimistic Bias
In this section, we test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The earnings forecasts of financial
analysts are, on average, too optimistic, i.e., the
consensus forecasts are systematically higher than
reported earnings.
Hypothesis 2: The optimistic bias diminishes with
a decreasing forecast horizon.
Hypothesis 3: The dispersion of forecast errors
diminishes with a decreasing forecast horizon.
These hypotheses are motivated by results of prior
research in the U.S. as well as the study of
HU¨FNER/MO¨LLER (1997) in Germany. The first
hypothesis states that analysts, on average, did not
learn from the experience of overly optimistic
forecasts in the years before the time period under
study, so that the bias has to be regarded as a
rather permanent phenomenon. A persistence of
optimism would be indirect evidence of systematic
factors pushing analysts towards higher forecasts.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Actual Earnings Deflated by Book Value of Equity
Year N Mean Skewness Kurtosis 25% Quartile Median 75% Quartile
1991 76 0.1099 j0.3152 4.9054 0.0794 0.1147 0.1486
1992 81 0.0840 j1.3849 5.4694 0.0474 0.0997 0.1475
1993 90 0.0444 j1.4664 3.1015 0.0290 0.0851 0.1368
1994 94 0.0854 j1.2993 8.5875 0.0477 0.0916 0.1355
1995 91 0.0688 j1.6425 4.9833 0.0558 0.0989 0.1488
1996 90 0.1009 j1.4329 5.6410 0.0725 0.1181 0.1547
1997 92 0.1521 j0.1209 10.0278 0.0908 0.1428 0.2080
1998 91 0.1502 j0.2973 5.2254 0.0941 0.1521 0.1996
1999 93 0.1418 1.1325 11.6080 0.0841 0.1260 0.1814
2000 79 0.1396 0.6973 2.1934 0.0791 0.1162 0.1731
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The second hypothesis rests on the assumption that
analysts correct their overly optimistic (or pessimis-
tic) forecasts when approaching the date of the
official announcement of earnings. When more
precise information on the firms’ profitability
becomes available during the year, high-flying
earnings expectations have to be abandoned. Other-
wise, analysts risk to be unmasked as poor fore-
casters. Hypothesis 3 states that the forecast
accuracy gets better with a shortening of the forecast
horizon. This seems obvious, since more informa-
tion is available to the analysts when coming closer
to the earnings release date.
As a first illustration, the scatter-plots in Figure 1
show the levels of MFE and SFE for the last
forecast period of the sample period, which is the
year 2000. In each case, the x-coordinate displays
the forecast horizon, defined as the distance
between the time of prediction and the end of the
fiscal year to which the forecasts pertain. The
forecast horizon is expressed in months. It is
evident from the left graph that the analysts were
far too optimistic in forecasting the profits of the
fiscal year 2000. Thirty months before earnings
disclosure, i.e., in mid 1998, analysts forecasted
book returns for 2000 that were on average 5%
higher than the book returns actually reported later.
The mean forecast error gradually decreases until
earnings disclosure. At the beginning of 2000,
MFE still amounts to about 1.6%.[28] Not surpris-
ingly, the plot on the right of Figure 1 reveals a
decreasing dispersion of forecast errors when ap-
proaching the forecast horizon.
Of course, it is not possible to draw any conclusions
from only one year. Such a finding might be caused
by an economic shock which diminished the earn-
ings of most firms. But in 8 out of 10 years of the
sample period the results are similar. Only in 1997
and 1998 no systematic bias—in either direction—
was observed.
Table 2 summarizes the empirical results for fore-
cast horizons of 6, 12, and 18 months.[29] With
Figure 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Forecast Errors in 2000
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the exception of 1997, all mean forecast errors are
positive. The errors increase with a longer forecast
horizon, once again with the exception of 1997
and 1998. For most years and forecast horizons,
the MFE-values are significantly positive at least
at the 5% level. In addition, the fraction of posi-
tive forecast errors (% pos in Table 2) consider-
ably exceeds 50% in most cases. Thus, there is
strong evidence of prevailing over-optimism in the
sample period. We conclude that Hypotheses 1 to
3 are strongly supported by the data.
4.2 Determinants of the Degree of Optimism
4.2.1 Hypotheses
The degree of optimism presumably varies system-
atically in the cross-section of firms. Knowing
which firms are particularly subject to overly opti-
mistic forecasts would help to enlighten the pre-
vailing motives and incentives of analysts. It would
also enable investors to correct the bias if they as-
sume that the same motives and incentives will be
effective in the future. Therefore, this section deals
with the determinants of analysts’ predisposition to
exaggerated earnings forecasts. As stated earlier, it
is important to notice that this analysis is descriptive
in nature. Since we restrict ourselves to consensus
data, we cannot uncover factors that reflect the
individual situation and incentives of an analyst.
The forecast horizon is fixed to twelve months,
i.e., we include forecasts launched at the begin-
ning of a fiscal year. This choice can be justified
by the fact that the forecasts for the next year
usually attract the greatest attention.[30] The
following relationships are hypothesized:
Hypothesis 4: The degree of optimism is, on
average, higher for growth stocks than for value
stocks.
As usual, growth stocks are defined as firms whose
stock price reflects a high implicit market expecta-
tion of the future growth rate of dividends or
earnings. To measure this characteristic, we use the
book-to-market ratio of equity. A high ratio indi-
cates a value stock, whereas growth stocks exhibit a
low book value of equity per unit of market
capitalization. It is well documented that the book-
to-market ratio was positively related to mean future
stock returns at most international markets during
the last decades.[31] Although the reasons for this
Table 2: Mean Forecast Errors for Different Forecast Horizons
Forecast Period
Forecast Horizon
6 Months 12 Months 18 Months
MFE N % Pos. MFE N % Pos. MFE N % Pos.
1991 2.11%** 80 62.5 2.73%** 76 63.2
1992 4.16%** 89 69.7 4.75%** 81 72.8 4.92%** 64 75.0
1993 5.79%** 90 64.4 7.06%** 90 68.9 10.33%** 83 81.9
1994 1.81% 96 53.1 2.02%* 94 57.4 2.64%** 88 59.1
1995 4.72%** 92 63.0 6.07%** 91 62.6 6.33%** 89 56.2
1996 1.44% 92 50.0 3.28%** 90 57.8 5.55%** 87 70.1
1997 j0.55% 92 40.2 j0.65% 92 37.0 j0.30% 87 42.5
1998 1.37%* 94 57.4 0.69% 91 49.5 0.66% 88 40.9
1999 2.44%* 95 60.0 3.89%** 93 60.2 4.53%** 90 62.2
2000 1.06% 81 55.6 1.62%* 79 59.5 3.12%** 77 63.6
Note:
*Significant at the 5% level (one-tailed).
**Significant at the 1% level (one-tailed).
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phenomenon are still the subject of an ongoing
debate, there is strong support for an explanation
based on irrational market behavior.[32] According
to this hypothesis, the highest implicit growth rates
are unrealistically high and vice versa. When the
biased expectations are corrected, the book-to-
market ratios reverse to their cross-sectional mean.
Hypothesis 4 states that analysts are mistaken in
the same direction as the stock market partici-
pants. The experience with the boom of new in-
ternet stocks up to 2000 seems to support the
presumption of such overreactions especially
among growth stocks.
Hypothesis 5: The optimistic bias is more pro-
nounced in the second half of the sample period
than in the first one.
The analyst community is often criticized for
having fuelled the stock market bubble. Thus,
the market mania of the second half of the 1990s
should be reflected in particularly optimistic
earnings forecasts.
Hypothesis 6 [33]: The degree of optimism is
 negatively related to firm size (Hypothesis 6a),
 positively related to the stock return volatility
(Hypothesis 6b),
 positively related to the standard deviation of
forecasts among all forecasts launched for one
firm-year combination (Hypothesis 6c).
The extent and the quality of released information
generally increase with a higher market capitaliza-
tion. The investment community concentrates its
attention on the DAX30 companies, which are
characterized by a large market capitalization and a
high trading liquidity. These firms usually organize
analyst meetings to elucidate current information
about their business outlook. In issuing its own
earnings forecasts, the management often transmits
a valuable clue to analysts. For these reasons, the
optimistic bias is expected to be less pronounced
in the group of blue chips among the DAX100
firms.[34] In this study, firm size is measured by
the log of market capitalization.
Assuming that an overall tendency towards overly
optimistic forecasts exists, we expect the bias to
be stronger in an environment of high uncertainty.
The overweighting of positive outcomes and vice
versa has a larger impact if the possible outcomes
are widely dispersed. Higher uncertainty also
makes it more difficult to detect biases, so that it
protects analysts who are willing to issue positive
judgments. As a proxy of forecast uncertainty, we
employ the stock return volatility estimated from
monthly returns over the last five years. There is
an additional reason to expect a positive link be-
tween analyst disagreement and biased forecasts
according to Hypothesis 6c:[35] Analysts with
very low earnings expectations might prefer not to
publish them since a negative outlook could be
harmful to their career.[36]
Hypothesis 7: The optimistic bias increases with
less intensive coverage of firms. The coverage is
measured by the number of individual forecasts
available for calculating the consensus forecast.
The number of analysts covering a stock is used as a
proxy for possible conflicts of interest. If few
forecasts are issued, these can be expected to
primarily stem from banks with a client relationship
with the respective firm. In a larger sample of
forecasts, the influence of such banks on the
consensus is less strong. One disadvantage of this
proxy certainly is that the coverage also depends on
the market capitalization, so that it might be
impossible to disentangle the relative importance
of both variables.
4.2.2 Empirical Results
The following empirical analyses focus on a forecast
horizon of 12 months, i.e., forecasts are launched at
the beginning of each fiscal year.[37,38] We
performed all calculations with and without apply-
ing a rule for detecting and eliminating outliers.
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Such outliers can, for example, be due to a low book
value of equity. Since we divide the earnings per
share by book equity, a value near zero will boost
deflated earnings. We define a data point as an
outlier if either the absolute value of earnings related
to book equity is higher than 100% or absolute
forecast errors exceed 50%. These conditions apply
to about 2% of the data sets. In the following, we
report the empirical results after excluding these
data. Without elimination of outliers, all results
remain practically unchanged. The only differences
worth mentioning are slightly higher mean forecast
errors and a marginally better performance of
analysts compared to other forecast models.
We perform univariate tests of the hypotheses. For
this purpose, the pool of sample (time-series and
cross-sectional) data is divided into two equally
sized groups according to the chosen determinant.
In the first case, the sorting is carried out each
year. Each year, firms with a low value of the
sorting variable are assigned to the first group of
pooled data and the remaining stocks are assigned
to the second group. In the second case, the
sorting is done only once for the pooled data of all
firm-year combinations. The hypothesis of nor-
mally distributed forecast errors is always rejected
at the 1% significance level. Therefore, we apply
the Wilcoxon Rank-sum test to examine whether
the null hypothesis of equal medians of forecast
errors in the two groups can be rejected at the 1%
or 5% level. The test statistic of the Wilcoxon
Rank-sum test, which is approximately normally
distributed, is shown in Table 3 for the total period
as well as two subperiods. The variables are
defined as follows:
BEME: Book-to-market ratio of equity,
SUB : Subperiods,
CAP : Logarithm of market capitalization,
VOL : Stock return volatility,
STD : Standard deviation of forecasts,
NUM : Number of forecasts included in the
consensus.
The results clearly indicate that Hypotheses 4 and 5
are not supported by the data. Contrary to our
expectation, value stocks experienced a significantly
more pronounced optimistic bias than growth
stocks in the first subperiod (1991 to 1995). This
relationship disappears in the second subperiod.[39]
We also do not find a rising overall degree of
optimism in the sample period. On the contrary, the
median of forecast errors observed in the second
subperiod is significantly lower than the respective
median in the first subperiod. This is compatible
with the earlier finding of unbiased forecasts in the
years 1997 and 1998. Thus, the degree of optimism
diminished while stock prices gradually increased.
In view of the stock market mania and the
enthusiastic buy recommendations in the second
half of the 1990s, the earnings forecasts in this
period can be judged as relatively moderate.
Table 3: Determinants of the Degree of Optimistic Bias
Sorting Each Year Sorting Over All Years
1991–1995 1996–2000 1991–2000 1991–1995 1996–2000 1991–2000
BEME 2.97** 0.21 2.31* 3.22** 0.51 2.55*
SUB – – j2.77** – – j2.77**
CAP j2.79** j3.22** j4.25** j2.76** j3.10** j4.40**
VOL 0.75 2.01* 2.13* 1.61 3.40** 3.53**
STD 4.15** 1.93 4.37** 4.09** 2.53* 4.67**
NUM j0.43 0.82 j0.83 0.12 j0.39 j1.54
Note:
* Significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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The null hypothesis of no difference between the
median in the group of smaller stocks and the group
of blue chips is always rejected at the 1% signifi-
cance level. As expected, the median is lower within
the subsample of large capitalization stocks. The
second important determinant seems to be the
standard deviation of forecasts as a measure of
uncertainty. Higher uncertainty is associated with a
higher median of forecast errors. The difference
between both groups is significant at least at the 5%
level, except for the second subperiod in the case of
yearly sorting. Thus, Hypotheses 6a and 6c are
validated. The stock return volatility points in the
same direction as the variable STD, but there is no
significant relationship between VOL and forecast
errors in the first subperiod. Contrary to Hypothesis 7,
the results do not indicate a uniform and systematic
relation between the degree of coverage and the
optimistic bias.
The Wilcoxon Rank-sum test requires identical
standard deviations of forecast errors in both groups.
Since the standard deviation might depend on the
same determinants as the degree of optimistic bias,
we estimated the standard deviation from sample
data of each group and calculated standardized
forecast errors. These are defined as forecast errors
divided by the sample standard deviation. We then
repeated the analysis using standardized forecast
errors. The results (not shown here) completely
confirm the above findings.
5. Comparison with Alternative
Forecasting Models
5.1 Forecasting Models
To further evaluate the predictive quality of ana-
lysts’ earnings forecasts, we compare them with
five alternative forecasting models. The models
employed in U.S. studies are often based on time
series of quarterly earnings in the estimation
period.[40] Such a comparison is not feasible in
Germany since the obligation of listed companies
to publish quarterly earnings was not introduced
until 2001.[41] Thus, in our sample period,
investors had to rely on annual earnings and
additional sources of information apart from
earnings to build an appropriate forecasting
model. Due to this restriction, we do not employ
time-series models. As before, all forecasts are
deflated by the book value of equity.
Our first model (M1) assumes that current
earnings constitute the best forecasts of earnings
in the next period:[42]
PM1i;tþ1 ¼
EPSi;t
EKi;t
; ð4Þ
where Pi, t + 1
M1 denotes the predicted earnings per
share of firm i in period t +1 and EPS are realized
earnings. Though truly naive in nature, this model
turned out to outperform more sophisticated rule-
based techniques at the U.S. market.[43] Since we
focus on forecasts issued at the beginning of a
fiscal year, current earnings (i.e., earnings of the
year just completed) have not yet been reported at
the time of prediction. As a proxy, we use analysts’
consensus estimates of the completed year’s earn-
ings. These are generally very close to the earnings
actually reported a few weeks later.
Model M1 neglects the empirical observation of a
mean-reverting tendency of earnings.[44] Extraor-
dinarily high earnings are generally unsustainable
in the long run, and huge losses are often followed
by more positive results. The latter observation
might be triggered by successful restructuring
efforts or by management’s ambition to concen-
trate all foreseeable negative events in one year in
order to avoid having to report a sequence of
losses. Model M2 draws a rigid conclusion from
the mean reversion by setting all forecasts equal to
the average of all current earnings in the cross-
section of firms:[45]
PM2i;tþ1 ¼ PM2tþ1 ¼
1
Nt
XNt
j¼1
EPSj;t
EKj;t
: ð5Þ
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The third model (M3) attempts to smooth earnings
more accurately. The forecasts are taken from a
linear regression of analyst’s forecasts on previous
year’s earnings. The regression line
CAFi;t;tþ1
EKi;t
¼ a0 þ a1 EPSi;t
EKi;t
þ "i;tþ1 ð6Þ
generally exhibits a slope coefficient a1 smaller
than 1. The slope reflects the analysts’ perception
of the degree of mean reversion in earnings. The
forecasts are calculated as:
PM3i;tþ1 ¼ a^0 þ a^1 EPSi;tEKi;t : ð7Þ
This model is included in order to test whether
analysts’ forecasts are informative beyond the
consideration of this mean tendency of earnings.
Our forth model (M4) generates forecasts from
capital budgeting theory. Forecasts are defined as
earnings required to cover the cost of capital. To
estimate such implicit forecasts, a valuation model
has to be pre-selected. Our implementation rests on
the dividend discount model with a constant growth
rate g (Gordon growth model). Clearly, the growth
rate is negatively related to the payout ratio since
retained earnings are reinvested, generating higher
interest earnings and dividends in the future.[46]
We use a fictitious payout ratio of 100%, implying
that there is no growth of dividends due to interests
on previously retained earnings.[47] As a conse-
quence, we chose a relatively low growth rate equal
to the expected inflation rate, which we assume to be
2.5%. Therefore, according to model M4, expected
earnings in the next period equal the current stock
price times thedifferencebetween the required rateof
return and the rate of perpetual growth:[48]
Ki;t ¼
E EPSi;tþ1
 
ki  g
PM4i;tþ1¼
E EPSi;tþ1
 
EKi;t
¼ ki  gð Þ Ki;t
EKi;t
;
ð8Þ
where K denotes the current stock price and k the
required rate of return.
The question of which model best explains cross-
sectional differences between the required rates of
stock return is still unresolved. The CAPM of
Sharpe, Lintner, and Mossin postulates that beta
explains differences in expected returns. Since the
1970s, various studies have disclosed regularities
(‘anomalies’) which seemingly contradict the
CAPM.[49] But the variables that seem to con-
tribute to the explanation of expected returns, such
as size and book-to-market ratio, lack a solid
theoretical foundation.[50] Therefore, we apply
the CAPM. We assume a risk-free rate of 4% and
a market risk premium of 3.5%.[51] The betas are
estimated from the time series of daily stock
returns during the previous year.
If a firm is not able to cover its required rate of
return, the weaknesses of its market position and
their determining factors will often persist over
more than one year. Model M5 presumes that half
of the discrepancy is overcome during the next
year. Thus, appropriate forecasts for the next period
are set equal to the average of current earnings
(M1) and earnings necessary to earn the required
rate of return (M4):
PM5i;tþ1 ¼ 0:5 PM1i;tþ1 þ PM4i;tþ1
 
: ð9Þ
5.2 Methodology
A specific loss function for examining the impact
of forecasting errors cannot be easily specified.
Therefore, the forecasting accuracy is measured
by the mean squared prediction error (MSE).
Given the predicted (Pi) and actual (Ai) earnings,
the MSE is defined as:
MSE ¼ 1
N
XN
i¼1
Pi  Aið Þ2: ð10Þ(8)
Wallmeier: Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts for DAX100 Firms
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 2 141
To test for statistically different mean squared
errors of alternative forecasting models, we com-
pute a t-statistic by dividing the MSE-difference
by its estimated standard deviation.[52] This test
statistic is approximately normally distributed for
large samples, assuming that all differences in
squared forecast error are drawn from the same
population. In the analyses of Section 1, the large
sample assumption could hardly be justified due
to the necessity to subdivide the data into two
groups. Therefore, we employed a nonparametric
test. In this section, the sample is not subdivided
so that always more than 75 forecasts are included
(see Table 2, forecast horizon 12 months).
The mean squared error can be decomposed into
three components for further analysis:[53]
MSE ¼ P  Að Þ2|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
C1
þ 1 bð Þ2s2P|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
C2
þ 1  R2 s2A|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
C3
;
ð11Þ
where P , A and sP
2, sA
2 denote, respectively, the
means and standard deviations of the predicted and
actual earnings; b is the estimated slope coefficient
of a regression of actuals on forecasts, and R2 is
the coefficient of determination of this regression.
The first term of equation (11), called error in
central tendency (C1), represents bias due to mis-
estimating the overall average of reported earn-
ings. The second component C2 catches errors due
to a rotation of the regression line compared to the
line of perfect forecasts characterized by b = 1. A
non-zero value of C2 indicates that high estimates
are systematically biased in one direction and
low estimates in the other. The third term C3 is a
residual component due to imperfect correlation
between forecasts and actuals.
In addition, we apply the concept of stochastic
dominance to compare different forecast mod-
els.[54] We define model i to dominate model j
according to first degree stochastic dominance if
the cumulative frequency of absolute forecast er-
rors below z2R+ is higher for model i, regardless
of the value of z. Formally:
Fi zð Þ  Fj zð Þ 8z and
Fi zð Þ 6¼ Fj zð Þ for at least one z;
ð12Þ
where Fi(z) is the cumulative frequency distri-
bution of absolute forecast errors generated by
model i.
Second degree stochastic dominance of model i
over model j is fulfilled if the following relation-
ship holds:
Z z
0
Fi xð Þdx 
Z z
0
FjðxÞdx 8z and
Fi zð Þ 6¼ Fj zð Þ for at least one z:
ð13Þ
5.3 Empirical Results
The results are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. The
tables include, for all forecasting models and
sample years, the root mean squared error RMSE,
the mean adjusted root mean squared errorﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
MSE  C1p ¼ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃC2þ C3p , the ranking of the
models in ascending order of RMSE and mean
adjusted RMSE, and the slope coefficient b from
equation (11). Table 5 also displays the mean
absolute error MAE and the decomposition of the
mean squared error of the analysts’ forecasts.
The analysts’ forecasts outperform all other models
in five out of nine years of the sample period
according to the RMSE-criterion. In two further
years they take second place. Only in 1999, the
analysts produce less than average results. However,
this year is characterized by very similar outcomes
of all models with a span of less than 0.02 between
the maximum and minimum RMSE.
Model M5 is the only method that does not seem
to be inferior to analysts’ consensus forecasts. In
each year, this model, which averages the fore-
casts of M1 and M4, turns out to be superior in
(12)
(13)
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RMSE to both the M1 and the M4 model. This
finding supports the supposition of earnings
gradually moving in the direction of their ‘equi-
librium level’ defined by the required rate of
return. Apart from the analysts’ forecasts, model
M1 is the only one that is never stochastically
dominated (first or second degree) by any other
method (see Table 6).
The relative importance of the first two MSE-
components in analysts’ forecasts strongly varies
from year to year. The MSE component C2 is near
zero in the total period, while significantly positive
in most single years. Apparently, there is an
overestimation of high earnings in some years and
an underestimation in others, which is also apparent
from variations of the slope coefficient b around 1
(see Table 5). In the total period under consider-
ation (pooled data), about 8.6% of the MSE of
analysts’ forecasts can be explained by the devia-
tion of the mean (component C1). This conveys an
impression of the extent to which improvements in
forecasting accuracy for individual stocks might be
achieved by correcting the optimistic bias. Remov-
ing this bias by mean adjusting the forecasts
considerably improves the ranking of analysts.
According to the mean adjusted RMSE-criterion,
they outperform model M5 in the total period and
in eight out of nine single years. The mean adjusted
RMSE is of particular interest to investors who
generate forecasts of the overall market level of
earnings by themselves and consult analysts’
forecasts only to learn about expected cross-
sectional differences in earnings.
The regression modelM3 is found in the top ranks in
most years, which indicates that considering the
mean-reverting tendency of earnings considerably
contributes to an improvement of forecasting accu-
racy. The worst performing model is the overall
mean model M2. This extreme form of smoothing
clearly generates unreliable earnings forecasts.
6. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the
performance of financial analysts in forecasting
earnings of German DAX100 firms in the 1990s.
The empirical results reveal that the well-known
optimistic bias was present throughout the entire
time period studied. On average, the analysts
successively corrected their overly optimistic fore-
casts when approaching the forecast horizon. The
optimistic bias has declined over time, which
seemingly contradicts the impression of enthusias-
tic buy recommendations maintained during the
stock market boom. Given the analysts’ consensus
forecasts, the high level of stock prices at the peak
of the boom could only be justified by assuming
Table 6: Test of Stochastic Dominance of Forecast Models (Total Period, Pooled Data)
Unadjusted Forecast Errors* Mean Adjusted Forecast Errors**
Analysts M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Analysts M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Analysts – 2 2 2 2 – 2 2
M1 – 2 – 2 2
M2 – –
M3 1 – 1 –
M4 2 – 2 –
M5 1 1 1 2 – 1 1 2 2 –
Notes:
1: Row-model dominates column-model according to first degree stochastic dominance.
2: Row-model dominates column-model according to second degree stochastic dominance.
*: z in equations (12) and (13) denotes the absolute value of forecast errors.
**: z in equations (12) and (13) denotes the absolute value of forecast errors shifted such that their mean value is zero.
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high growth rates in calculating the terminal value.
Thus, the optimism was presumably ‘transferred’
to more distant periods. The degree of the optimis-
tic bias was, on average, greater for smaller firms
and stocks with larger uncertainty.
The fraction of mean squared forecast errors that
can be attributed to the optimistic bias varies con-
siderably. In the total sample period, the bias
accounts for about 8% of mean squared errors.
The analysts’ forecasts turn out to be superior to
four of the five alternative forecasting methods
considered in this paper. The fifth model, which
assumes a gradual shift to an equilibrium earn-
ings level, produces similar results as the analysts.
When the optimistic bias is removed, the analysts’
consensus forecasts significantly outperform all
five benchmark models. Therefore, the forecasts
seem to be informative with respect to cross-
sectional earnings differences, even if the market
level of earnings is optimistically overstated.
This paper does not study the relationship between
analyst forecasts and stock returns. This seems to
be a promising extension for further research since
the accuracy of earnings forecasts is expected to
be influenced by the market participants’ reaction
to forecast errors.
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ENDNOTES
[1] After dishonest and illegal practices had been
uncovered by the New York State attorney, ten
leading investment banks agreed in April 2003
to pay in total 1.4 billion $ to settle the affair out
of court. See, e.g., Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, April
29, 2003, p. 29.
[2] A detailed description of possible conflicts
of interest can be found in HAX (1998) and
LO¨FFLER (1998a).
[3] As an example, Merrill Lynch was obliged to
disclose the detailed structure of its recommen-
dations under the bank’s agreement with the
NewYork state attorney. At the end ofMay 2002,
just after the agreement had been reached,
Merill Lynch gave nearly 3000 recommenda-
tions, more than half of which recommended to
buy. Sell recommendations accounted for a
fraction of only 6%. Rational investors will take
this distribution into account. Buy recommenda-
tions will therefore have a lower impact on stock
prices than negative outlooks; see the empirical
results of GERKE/OERKE (1998).
[4] See, e.g., PENMAN (2001).
[5] See CHAN/KARCESKI/LAKONISHOK (2003),
p. 3.
[6] This is not necessarily true for popular rank-
ings. For example, the influential analyst rank-
ings published annually in the Institutional
Investor magazine and The Wall Street Journal
typically combine stock picking performance
with the accuracy of earnings forecasts.
[7] See BROWN (1997).
[8] See, e.g., CAPSTAFF/PAUDYAL/REES
(2001), CHOPRA (1998), DREMAN/BERRY
(1995), DREMAN (1996), BROWN (1997),
KEANE/RUNKLE (1998), HU¨FNER/MO¨LLER
(1997), LO¨FFLER (1998b), BROWN (1993).
[9] See BROWN (1997).
[10] See CAPSTAFF/PAUDYAL/REES (1995,
1998, 2001), HUSSAIN (1996), HU¨FNER/
MO¨LLER (1997), DAS/LEVINE/SIVARAMK-
RISHNAN (1998), HODGKINSON (2001),
CLAUS/ THOMAS (2001).
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[12] See BROWN (1997), CHOPRA (1998),
CLAUS/THOMAS (2001).
[13] EHRBECK/WALDMANN (1996) test other
models of strategic bias due to the attempt of
mimicking able forecasters. Yet, the models
are rejected empirically.
[14] See also AMIR/GANZACH (1998).
[15] See CHOPRA (1998), p. 38.
[16] See CAPSTAFF/PAUDYAL/REES (1995,
1998, 2001), BROWN (1993), O’BRIEN
(1988), BROWN et al. (1987), BROWN/
RICHARDSON/SCHWAGER (1987), CON-
ROY/HARRIS (1987), GIVOLY/LAKONISHOK
(1984), FRIED/GIVOLY (1982).
[17] For a more comprehensive overview see
BOLLIGER (2004) and LIM (2001).
[18] See also MIKHAIL/WALTHER/WILLIS (2003).
[19] BULKLEY/HARRIS (1997) argue that this
might be an important cause of excess volatility
in stock prices.
[20] We thank I/B/E/S International Inc. for provid-
ing the earnings per share data of the
Institutional Brokers Estimate System. The
data have been provided as part of a broad
academic program to encourage earnings
expectations research.
[21] See BUSSE VON COLBE et al. (1996). It is
questionable whether DVFA earnings are more
informative than reported earnings. HU¨FNER/
MO¨LLER (2002) find that reported earnings are
more closely linked to contemporaneous stock
returns than DVFA earnings.
[22] We inspected cases in which there was a
particularly large discrepancy between fore-
casted and reported earnings to make sure
that realized earnings are indeed adjusted for
extra-ordinary items. Only few errors were
detected. The most significant one concerned
Fresenius Medical Care in 1999. The I/B/E/S
data base displays a realized loss of 3.15 EUR
per share, although the DVFA/SG earnings
amounted to a profit of 2.15 $. The difference
was due to expenses incurred to settle litiga-
tion out of court. In addition, the profit and loss
statement of Fresenius Medical Care was
nominated in U.S. dollar instead of Euro.
[23] See BEAVER (1999), p. 38.
[24] For convenience of presentation, we will con-
tinue to use the shorter term ‘earnings fore-
casts’ although ‘forecasts of earnings divided
by book equity’ would be more precise.
[25] The deflation of earnings is necessary from an
academic standpoint, but ‘the market’ seems to
consider earnings per share as the relevant
measure. Without deflating earnings, the main
conclusions remain valid.
[26] Only firms for which consensus forecasts are
available are included.
[27] See the studies on earnings management by
DASKE/GEBHARDT/MCLEAY (2003) and
BABALYAN (2004).
[28] At the end of the fiscal year (forecast horizon =
0), the MFE-value is near zero. Yet, the
earnings expectations seem to become more
unreliable in the following two months (see left
graph of Figure 1, forecast horizons -1 and -2).
The reason is that a considerable fraction of
analysts cancel their inputs at the balance
sheet date. Therefore, the two data points on
the left of the graph rest on a smaller number
of inputs.
[29] For longer forecast horizons than 18 months,
the number of available forecasts strongly
diminishes in the first years of the sample
period.
[30] We repeated the analysis for forecast horizons
of 6 and 18 months and received similar
results.
[31] See, e.g., FAMA/FRENCH (1992).
[32] See DANIEL/TITMAN (1997).
[33] This hypothesis is a modified version of hy-
potheses formulated by HU¨FNER/MO¨LLER
(1997).
[34] In accordance with this general hypothesis, in
his study for the U.S., BROWN (1997) finds
much smaller forecasting errors for S&P 500
firms than for other firms.
[35] See SCHERBINA (2004).
[11] See HU¨FNER/MO¨LLER (1997) and CHOPRA
(1998), p. 36.
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[37] We define the forecast horizon as the balance
sheet date instead of the time to publication.
[38] Fiscal years correspond to calendar years for
most DAX100 firms. Annual reports with a
balance sheet date different from December
31st are included only if the time difference is
at most three months.
[39] This corresponds to findings of MIAN/TEO
(2001) at the Japanese market.
[40] See, e.g., O’BRIEN (1988), BROWN et al.
(1987), and BROWN (1993) with further refer-
ences.
[41] The German accounting standard DRS 6
‘‘Zwischenberichterstattung’’ had to be applied
for the first time in the fiscal year beginning
after June 30, 2001. Previously, listed firms
had been legally required to publish an interim
report once a year. See COENENBERG/
ALVAREZ (2002), p. 2759.
[42] This is the ‘‘no change prediction’’ by CAP-
STAFF/ PAUDYAL/REES (1998). See also
WATTS/LEFTWICH (1977) and FRIED/GIV-
OLY (1982), who additionally include a growth
rate that is assumed to be equal to the average
growth in EPS in the past.
[43] See FRIED/GIVOLY (1982) with further refer-
ences.
[44] FAMA/FRENCH (2000) find strong evidence of
mean reversion in profitability.
[45] This model is analogous to the averaging
(smoothing) model for correlation matrices
tested by ELTON/GRUBER/URICH (1978).
[46] See, e.g., COPELAND/WESTON/SHASTRI
(2005), p. 503.
[47] Using the actual payout ratios of individual
firms would give the same valuation results if
the famous Modigliani-Miller-propositions hold.
In this case, changes in payout ratios are
perfectly offset by changes in the growth rate.
[48] This model is similar to the first forecasting
model of BEAVER/LAMBERT/MORSE (1980)
(again without using time series earnings data).
It corresponds to the simple forecast SF1 of
PENMAN (2001) with an asset base of value K.
[49] An overview of the large number of relevant
studies can be found in SHANKEN/KOTHARI
(2002) and, with an emphasis on the German
market, WALLMEIER (2000).
[50] See, e.g., HAUGEN (1995).
[51] CLAUS/THOMAS (2001) report implied costs
of capital for various markets that correspond
to a market risk premium of about 3 to 4%.
[52] The standard deviation of the mean difference
equals the standard deviation of the sample
differences divided by the square root of (N2-
N); see ELTON/GRUBER (1988), p. 1659.
[53] See THEIL (1971).
[54] COPELAND/WESTON/SHASTRI (2005) and
INGERSOLL (1987), among others, describe
the concept of stochastic dominance in the
field of portfolio management.
[36] See SCHERBINA (2004) for a comprehensive
discussion of this kind of ‘‘self-selection’’,
which had first been emphasized by MCNI-
CHOLS/O’BRIEN (1997).
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